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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a District Court's judgment granting Respondents' motion for
summary judgment against the Appellant and a District Court's order granting a Motion to Strike
Portions of the Affidavit of Henry Madsen.
B. Course of Proceedings
On September 5, 2012, the District Court entered an order granting summary judgment in
favor of the Respondent and also striking portions of the Affidavit of Henry Madsen, which was
submitted to the District Court on August 2, 2012, in support of Appellant's Response in
Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment.
The District Court entered a final judgment in favor of the Respondent on October 18,
2012. This judgment established that there was no genuine issue of fact to be submitted to the
trial court and concluding that the Respondent was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The judgment also struck portions of the AffIdavit of Henry Madsen filed on August 2,
2012, in support of Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment.
It is from the judgment entered on October 18, 2012, that the Appellant now appeals.
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II.

A. Statement of Facts
On January 22, 2011, the Appellant utilized the Respondent's car wash to remove mud
and ice from her vehicle. Part of the car wash process required the Appellant's outside minors
on her Subaru Legacy to be pushed inward so they would not be damaged by the car wash's
large scrubbers. (Augmented Record, Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment file-stamped August 2,2012, Page 1 and 5; Affidavit of Hemy Madsen
in Support of Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment,
Exhibit A, p. 15, Ln. 3-8 and p. 19 Ln. 2-24; Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration,

p.

3;

Memorandum in

Support of Plaintiff's

Second Motion for

Reconsideration, p. 3, Ln. 17-20). After traversing on a conveyor through the covered car wash,
the Appellant entered onto a smoothed surface exit. (R., Vol. I, p. 46, Ln. 9-19). At the exit was
a mailbox, which was there so customers could give tips to the car wash employees.

The

Appellant got out of her vehicle then began to fix her mirrors so they would be in the correct
position to legally drive on a city road. When she first stepped out of her vehicle, she testified
that the ground was "amazingly dry." (R., Vol. I, p. 42, Ln. 18) However, as she rounded the
front of her car, the water from the car wash, and trailed by the cars which preceded her, created
a slick covering over the surface of a mixture of water and ice. (R., Vol. I, p. 42, Ln. 2) Falling
on the mixture of ice and water, the Appellant severely fractured her left wrist as she attempted
to brace her fall and protect the rest of her body. The fall and the fracture to the wrist are not
disputed by the parties.
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However, the District Court determined that

.Appellant did not lCllo\v what she fell on.

(R., Vol. I, p. 27, Ln. 4) It analyzed the Appellant's deposition testimony and concluded that her
statements as to what she fell on were "speculative." (R., Vol. I, p. 27, Ln. 5) On September 5,
2012, the Appellant filed an affidavit clarifying her deposition testimony and testifying that
while the ground outside her car door was dry, the ground around the front of her car appeared to
be water but was really a mixture of ice and water. (R., Vol. I, p. 33, Ln. 12) However, after a
Motion for Reconsideration was filed, the District Court took into consideration the Appellant's
affidavit which clarified her deposition testimony but still granted the Respondent's Motion for
Summary Judgment on the basis that "the [Appellant] failed to demonstrate knowledge by the
[Respondent] of the condition and that [Respondent] did not have opportunity to remediate the
situation." (R., Vol. I, p. 67, Ln. 15)
As the Plaintiff/Appellant is a native Russian speaker and having English as a second
language, the Affidavit of Plaintiff Irina Shea in Support of Plaintiff s Motion for
Reconsideration, filed on September 5, 2012, was intended to clarify the Plaintiffs often
misunderstood deposition testimony. In it, she states that the areas around her car doors were
dry, but that the ground in front of her car appeared to have a coat of water on it. (Augmented
Record, Affidavit of Plaintiff Irina Shea in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration,
file-stamped September 5, 2012). However, when the Plaintiff slipped on what appeared to be
water, she realized it was more than just water or ice, and that it was likely a mixture of both
water and ice. (Augmented Record, Affidavit of Plaintiff Irina Shea in Support of Plaintiff s
Motion for Reconsideration, file-stamped September 5, 2012, Page 2)
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In any event, the

Appella..'1t made it clear in her affidavit that there was definitely ice on the ground in front of her
car when she slipped.
The District Court failed to agree with the Appellant that the Respondent did have prior
knowledge of the hazardous condition. However, the temperature on January 22,2011 (the date
of the incident) was established to be between 28.9° Faluenheit and 39.9° Famenheit, well within
the freezing level of 32.0° Fahrenheit. (Augmented Record, Exhibit A to Plaintiff s Response in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavit of Henry D. Madsen, filestamped August 21,2013). The Respondent operated a car wash, which pushed out water onto
the cement exit. He testified that "every car that comes tmough [the car wash] is dripping a little
water."

(Augmented Record, Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for

Reconsideration, file-stamped September 5, 2012, Page 3)
Freezing weather and water combined creates at the very least a constructive notice of a
hazardous condition-especially considering the Respondent had owned and operated the
business for 12 years and had instructed his employees to spread de-icer on the ice/water mixture
at the exit.

(Augmented Record, Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for

Reconsideration, file-stamped September 5, 2012, Page 3) The Respondent admitted in his
deposition that the car wash created a place for water to track onto the exit of the car wash and
freeze in the wintertime. (Augmented Record, Memorandum in SUPPOli of Plaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration, file-stamped September 5, 2012, Page 4)

Further, the Respondent even

admitted that on the date of the incident, the exit of the car wash was "cold and icy."
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(Augmented Record, Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration, filestamped September 5, 2012, Page 6)
The District Court took Kevin Lett's testimony to be a generalization of the weather on
the day of the incident. (R., Vol. I, p. 26, Ln. 21) It failed to see that the Respondent was not
asked what the conditions on the day of the incident were, but he was asked specifically what the
conditions were at the exit of the car wash on the day of the incident. Such context is important
because it shows the Respondent knew the conditions at the exit of the car wash were "cold and
icy." In that testimony, he shows his actual knowledge of the hazardous condition.

II.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
(a)

Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment to the Respondent?

(b)

Did the District Court err when it (i) denied Appellant's First Motion for

Reconsideration and (ii) granted Respondent's Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of
Henry Madsen?
(c)

Did the District Court err when it denied Appellant's Second Motion for

Reconsideration?
(d)

Should this Court award Appellant her attorney fees and costs on appeal?

III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The "standard of review on appeal from an order granting summary judgment is the same
standard that is used by the district court in ruling on the motion." Gibson v. Ada Cnty., 142
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Idal10 746, 751, 133 P.3d 1211, 1216 (2006). The District Court's standard is finding summary

judgment appropriate "only when the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions on file
show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law." Id. at 751, 1216 (citing LR.C.P. 56(c); McCann v. lvfcCann, 138 Idaho 228, 232,
61 P.3d 585, 589 (2002».

Further, when assessing a motion for summary judgment, all

controverted facts are to be liberally construed in favor of the nonmoving party. The trial court
must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party resisting the motion. G & M Farms v.
Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517, 808 P.2d 851, 854 (1991). The party moving for
summary jUdgment initially carries the burden to establish there is no "genuine issue of material
fact" and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho
400,404, 848 P.2d 984,988 (Ct.App.1992). The burden may be met by establishing the absence
of evidence on an element that the non-moving party will be required to prove at trial. Dunnick
v. Elder, 126 Idaho 308,311,882 P.2d475, 478 (Ct. App. 1994).
A motion for reconsideration is brought under Rule 11(a)(2)(B) of the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure. "The denial of a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Van v. PortneufMed. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552,560,212 P.3d 982,990 (2009).
In order to review a discretionary decision, this COUli "conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to
determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
whether the lower court acted \\rithin the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any
legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the court reached its
decision by an exercise of reason." Rockv Mountain Power v. Jensen, 154 Idaho 549, 300 P.3d
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1037, 1042 (2012)(citing Lee v. Nickerson, 146 Idaho 5, 9, 189 P.3d 467,471 (2008)(citing State
Ins. Fund v. Jarolimek, 139 Idaho 137, 138-39, 75 P.3d 191, 192-93 (2003)).

IV.
ARGUMENT
(a)

Did the District Court Err When It Granted Summary Judgment To
Respondent and (i) granted Respondent's Motion to Strike Portions of
the Affidavit of Henry Madsen'?

In this case, the Respondent failed to prove that there were no issues of material fact.
The Appellant knew that she slipped on something slippery which appeared to have been a
combination of water and ice. Her testimony throughout the proceedings were consistent that
where she stepped from the car at the tip box, the surface was dry but when she began to walk
across the front of the car toward the other side to pull her mirror out, the area in front of her car
appeared to have water. However, once Ms. Shea slipped, she immediately realized it was ice,
and perhaps a combination of both water and ice. Further, all of the evidence shown to the
District Court pointed to there being water, ice, or a mixture of ice and water, in the area of the
car wash exit.
This Court has consistently ruled that the question of whether or not there was ice
accumulation is a question of fact and that summary judgment is not appropriate. For instance,
in the case of McKinley v. Lyco Enterprises, Inc., 111 Idaho 792, 727 P.2d 1220 (1986), a
Plaintiff slipped and fell on a darkened sidewalk at his apartment complex. The fall occurred at
10:00 p.m. at night, the Plaintiff did not see what he slipped on, but assumed it was ice based on
the weather and other circumstances. This Comi detennined that there were several questions of
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material fact which made sum.lllary judgment improper, namely, whether or not there was snow
or ice on the ground and whether or not the Defendant knew or should have known of the
existence of snow or ice. That is what the instant case is about: (1) did the Appellant slip on ice
or a mixture of ice and water and (2) did the Respondent know, or should he have reasonably
known, there was ice or a mixture of ice and water at the end of his car wash. These are very
basic questions of material fact, and the District Court should have been inclined to follow the
case law and not grant summary judgment. As this Court discussed in McKinley, even if the
facts are "hotly contested," all facts and legitimate inferences are to be construed favorably to the
non-moving party, which in this case was the Appellant. rd. at 792, 1220. The District Court
failed to do that here.
This Court has reviewed other cases which discussed the accumulation of ice and snow
and determined that they contain questions of material fact that precluded summary judgment,
including when the invitee did not see the substance they slipped on.

See, Ball v. City of

Blackfoot, 152 Idaho 673, 273 P.3d 1266 (2012)(inferences drawn in favor of non-moving patiy
that there was conflicting evidence regarding ice on a sidewalk and an owner's duty to keep the
premises in a reasonably safe condition which precluded summary judgment).
The Court applied the Antim v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., 150 Idaho 774, 251 P.3d 602
(Idaho Ct. App. 2011) standard when ruling on this motion for summary judgment in eITor. As
applied, the Court found Antim to require that the "[Appellant] must establish that in order for
the landowner or possessor of land to be held liable for injuries to an invitee caused by a
dangerous condition existing on the land, it must be shown that the owner or occupier knew, or
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by the existence of reasonable care, should have known of the existence of the dangerous
condition." (R., Vol. I, p. 26, Ln. 8) The Court, applying Antim, also ruled that the "[Appellant]
had not established that the [Respondent] was advised or had knowledge of the allegedly
dangerous condition prior to the accident." (R., Vol. I, p. 26, Ln. 14)

Despite applying

reasonable inferences in favor of the Appellant (i.e., the Respondent having worked at the car
wash for 12 years and in the wintertime; the temperature on the date of the incident being
freezing; the Appellant's affidavit confirming that the ground was icy; the Respondent
specifically admitting that the ground at the exit of the car wash was "cold and icy") the District
Court ruled that the Respondent did not have actual or constructive notice of the dangerous
condition as required under Antim. The Court in applying the Antim standard was in error.
Antim is a case which requires actual or constructive notice when the dangerous
condition is an "isolated incident."

The Court, in agreeing with Respondent's Motion for

Summary Judgment, stated that the Respondent did not have actual or constructive notice of the
hazardous condition. The Respondent cited numerous cases regarding notice to the owner of the
hazardous condition. He cited Tommerup v. Albertson, Inc., 101 Idaho 1,607 P.2d 1055 (1980),
where the case revolved around an isolated incident of a customer slipping on a cupcake
wrapper; Antim v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., 150 Idaho 774, 251 P.3d 602 (Idaho Ct. App. 2011),
where the case revolved around an isolated incident where a customer tripped on a rolled up mat;
and Giles v. Montgomery Ward, 94 Idaho 484, 491 P.2d 1256 (1971), again an isolated incident
where a customer slipped on an unidentifiable "tiny spot" of slippery floor.
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However, all of the cases cited by the Respondent and relied upon by the District Court
dealt with situations wherein the invitee was injured based on a condition that only occurred
once, something this Court called an "isolated incident," versus what was occurring at Lett's
Cm"wash, which was an ongoing dangerous condition. The difference in this case is that in the
regular course of business, the Respondent's car wash created a foreseeable risk of danger by
allowing water to leave the car wash, enter the exit of the car wash, and subsequently mix with
freezing air which created ice. This dangerous condition did not just happen when the Plaintiff
was at the car wash-it was constantly occurring and was simply the Plaintiff's bad luck that she
happened to be the one to succumb to the dangerous condition. Most impOliantly, a dangerous
condition which is ongoing such as this requires neither constructive nor actual notice. See,
McDonald v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 109 Idaho 305, 707 P.2d 416, (1985).
This Court said that "in Tommerup, and most recently in McDonald, 707 P.2d 416
(1985), we distinguished the nonrecurring or isolated incident situation--where actual or
constructive notice of the specific condition must be shown-from circumstances where the
plaintiff shows that the operating methods of the landowner or possessor are such that dangerous
conditions are continuous or easily foreseeable. Tommerup, supra at 3-4, 607 P.2d at 10571058." All v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., 109 Idaho 479, 482, 708 P.2d 884,887 (1985).
" ... [W]hen the operating methods of a proprietor are such that dangerous conditions are
continuous or easily foreseeable, the logical basis for the notice requirement dissolves. Then,
actual or constructive notice of the specific condition need not be proved." All v. Smith's Mgmt.
Corp., 109 Idaho 479, 481, 708 P.2d 884, 886 (1985)(citing Buttrey Food Stores Division v.

- 15 -

Coulson, 620 P.2d 549, 552-53 (Wyo.1980); Jasko v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 177 Colo. 418, 494
P.2d 839, 840 (1972); Mahoney v. lC. Penney Co., 71 N.M. 244, 377 P.2d 663,673 (1962)).
Even the Respondent acknowledged that when ice would build up at the exit of the car
wash, he instructed his employees to spread de-icer on the exit. (Augmented Record, Deposition
Transcript of Kevin Lett, p. 16-18, attached to the Second Affidavit of Chris H. Hansen in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, file-stamped August 10, 2012) The only reason to
believe ice could be created at the exit of the car wash was because of the action of the car wash,
that is, water running off cars or water being pushed out of the covered car wash and into the
exit. Such an incident is far from isolated, and would fall under the standards in McDonald and
All.
It would be an unjust state of things if, as the District Court has ruled, a business owner

who puts into motion the device that creates the hazardous condition, can just simply walk away
and ignore the hazard even though he has invited the public upon his property and was paid for
his services. Lett's Car Wash, and its owner Kevin Letts, started up the car wash that morning,
invited Ms. Shea to procure his services through his marquee in front of his business, took her
money at the entrance to the car wash, pushed in her mirrors before she entered the car wash but
provided no assistance at the exit-requiring her to exit her vehicle to pull her mirrors out before
entering upon a public highway-and provided her with no warnings, either verbal or otherwise,
that there were slick conditions at the exit. Lett's Car Wash and Kevin Letts owed Ms. Shea a
higher standard of care than the Antim standard.
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On August 10, 2012, the Respondent filed a motion with the District Court to strike
portions of the Affidavit of Henry Madsen in Support of Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed on August 2, 2012.

The District Court

granted the Respondent's motion and struck the Paragraph 3 of Mr. Madsen's affidavit relating
to photographs and testimony contained on page 16 of the Respondent's deposition as well as
Paragraph 5 of Mr. Madsen's affidavit which identified and related to a letter from EMC
Insurance Company, the Respondent's insurer. (R. Vol. I, p. 28, Ln. 9 and p. 29, Ln. 6)
The Appellant submits to this Court that the photographs, testimony and
information contained in the EMC Insurance Company letter which the District Court struck
established facts which should have been considered by the District Court at summary judgment
and reconsideration hearings.
(i)

The Court should not have granted Respondent's Motion to Strike
Portions of the Affidavit of Henry Madsen?
(a)

Paragraph 3 of the Affidavit

This Court has held that photographs are admissible even if taken on a date different from
the date of the incident, so long as any changes in the conditions can be explained by a witness
and the changes are not so substantial that the photograph is rendered deceptive. Riksem v.
Hollister, 96 Idaho 15, 16,523 P.2d 1361,1362 (1974) (citing Werth v. Tromberg, 90 Idaho 204,
409 P.2d 421 (1965); McKee v. Chase, 73 Idaho 491, 253 P.2d 787 (1953); Bell, Handbook of
Evidence for the Idaho Lawyer, 2d Ed., 1972, at p. 180).
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Mr. Lett's testimony about the photograph is importal1t to provide a visual of the location
of the incident and the probability of ice buildup based on the conditions of the car wash. His
testimony explained any possible changes in appearance of the car wash and depicted what the
photograph shows: that the car wash pushes water out of its exit onto a concrete slab which
slopes towards the street. It shows the mailbox associated with a request by the Lett's Car Wash
for tips requiring patrons to stop in the slick and sloped area and lack of parking for customers
and the possibility that the buildup of water could become a buildup of slick, black ice. Further,
it showed that there was no water on the sides of where a vehicle would be positioned at the exit,
but that there would certainly be water at the front of a vehicle should someone get out of their
vehicle and walk around their car to readjust the vehicle's mirrors.
The photograph was not intended to depict the icy conditions on the day of the
incident; rather, it showed that the Respondent created an ongoing condition rather than an
"isolated incident" as described above. Further, the photos depicted the nature of the businesses
Kevin Letts operated at the location-the car wash and the mechanics shop. The photographs
were relevant to show that Kevin Letts was at the car wash while working as a mechanic in the
shop which further confirmed his knowledge of the cold and icy conditions at the exit of the car
wash on the day in question.
Further, in his deposition, Mr. Lett testified that with regard the pictures shown him,
which included the picture in question here, and the buildings and the area depicted in said
pictures had not changed in any way since he owned the businesses. (Augmented Record,
Affidavit of Hemy Madsen in Support of Plaintiff s Memorandum in Support of her Second
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"Motion for Reconsideration, Deposition of Kevin Lett, April 13, 2012, p. 36, Ln. 1-19) That said
statements in support of the pictures were appropriate foundation as to the relevance of the same.
(b)

Paragraph 5 of the Affidavit

The Appellant intended to use the insurance letter to strengthen her argument that there
was ice on the ground at the exit of the car wash.

In the letter, sent to the Appellant only four

weeks after the incident, identified that she did slip on ice at the exit of the car wash.
(Augmented Record, Affidavit of Henry D. Madsen in Support of Plaintiffs Response in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment file-stamped August 2,2012, Exhibit
C, Page 1) EMC Insurance's letter states that EMC Insurance interviewed the Respondent, used
an independent adjuster to photograph and diagram the premises and never interviewed the
Appellant. Yet, EMC Insurance was able to obtain nearly identical facts of the case without
having the oppOliunity to speak with Appellant. EMC Insurance's letter gives independent merit
to Appellant's case in chief and is material to the case. Furthermore, the statements contained in
the letter are clearly statements against EMC's and Lett's Car Wash's interests which further
bolsters the statements' credibility.
Rule 803(6) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence allows business records to be introduced as
evidence if the records are of "regularly conducted activity." The rule states, in part:
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events,
conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from
information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a
regularly conducted business activity, if it was the regular practice of that
business activity to make the memorandum, repOli, record, or data compilation,
all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness ...
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I.R.E. 803(6). The rule requires the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness
to determine the trustworthiness of the report, as is the standard for many of the hearsay
exceptions to the Rule. The Respondent made no objection to the letter as being untrustworthy
in his Motion to Strike, and it is not the Appellant's belief that there would be any reasonable
objection to the letter as being untrustwOlihy.
EMC Insurance, like many insurance companies who investigate claims against their
insureds, conduct investigations into claims made against the insured. It was reasonable to
believe that EMC Insurance creates records such as the letter being submitted by the Affidavit of
Henry Madsen on a regular basis in the course of ordinary business while investigating claims
against their insureds. A lawsuit had not been filed and the letter was created and sent to the
Appellant near the time of the incident.
"The general requirements for the admission of business records are that the documents
be 'produced in the ordinary course of business, at or near the time of occurrence and not in
anticipation of trial.' Beco Corp. v. Roberts & Sons Constr. Co., 114 Idaho 704, 711, 760 P.2d
1120, 1127 (1988). These foundational requirements 'supply the degree of trustworthiness
necessary to justify an exception to the rule against hearsay.' Id. It is necessary that the
circumstances behind the creation of the business records 'impl[y] a high degree of veracity.'
Christensen v. Rice, 114 Idaho 929, 934, 763 P.2d 302, 307 (Ct.App.1988)(citing: Hurtado v.
Land O'Lakes, Inc., 147 Idaho 813, 815,215 P.3d 533,535 (2009)).
Additionally, Rule 803(24) provides for an exception to the Hearsay Rule if "a statement
not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial
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guarantees of trustwolihiness, if the court detennines that (A) the statement is offered as
evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is
offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts ... "
The independent investigation conducted by the insurance company on behalf of the
Respondent uncovered the exact same facts as those supplied by the Appellant at summary
judgment.

The insurance company's admissible letter corroborated the Appellant's factual

history and should have been considered as a reasonable inference in favor of the Appellant
when the District COUli ruled on Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment.
(b)

Did the District Court err when it denied Appellant's First Motion
Reconsideration and

The Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration centered on two issues.

First, did the

Respondent have, or was it required to show he had, actual or constructive knowledge of the
dangerous condition. Second, was it required that the Appellant know precisely what she slipped
on.
First, as set forth above, there is sufficient case law and facts of this case to differentiate
between an "isolated incident" and an "ongoing incident." It was, and remains, the Appellant's
belief that the conditions at Lett's Car Wash in the winter time is an ongoing dangerous
condition and did not require the Appellant to show the Respondent had actual or constructive
notice. This Court said that the logical basis for the notice requirement dissolves when the
conduct is ongoing. Such was the case here.
Second, the Appellant testified that the front of her car had a coat on the ground of what
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appeared at fIrst to be water. However, when she stepped on it and slipped, she realized it was
actually water, ice or a mixture of both water and ice.

The Court believed there was not

sufficient evidence, despite her affidavit, to show that she could identify the substance she fell
on. However, it is not required for her to prove precisely what she fell on at summary judgment.
Whether or not the Appellant slipped on ice or water, or anything else, is a question of
fact to be determined by a jury, not by the District Court during summary judgment. We saw a
district court similarly err in McKinley, where there was a question as to whether or not the
Plaintiff had actually seen what he slipped on prior to falling:
The record before the Court demonstrates the existence of several questions of
material fact in controversy which are improperly decided on summary judgment,
and which should be left for resolution by a jury, i.e., (1) was there snow and/or
ice on the walkway ... and (4) was McKinley aware of the ice and/or snow on the
walkway, or in the exercise of reasonable care should he have been aware, and did
McKinley exercise reasonable care.
Id. at 792 (emphasis added).
In another case, this Court ruled that summary judgment was not appropriate when there
was a question as to whether or not a defendant allowed ice to accumulate under a coat of fresh
snow on a sidewalk in front of a mall. McCasland v. Floribec, Inc., 106 Idaho 841,683 P.2d 877
(1984)(superseded by statute on other grounds). The plaintiff, taking careful steps because of the
snow, slipped on what she alleged was a "bump of ice concealed by the freshly fallen snow,"
despite not being able to see the actual ice.

Id. at 877. The trial court granted summary

judgment in part because the plaintiff could not see what she slipped on. However, this Court
disagreed with the trial court and overturned the summary judgment, stating that a
"[d]etermination of possessor liability necessarily involves questions of fact." Id. at 878.
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Again here, the District Cou..rt ruled during SUITlI11ary judgment arguments that the
Appellant's statement that she "maybe" slipped on a mixture of ice and water was speculation
and because of her speculation there are no genuine issues of material fact.
However, the Appellant was responding specifically to the question of whether or 110t she
slipped on ice or water, she was unsure only as to whether or not there was a mixture of both.
She knew that she slipped on ice, and she was slipping on the ice as she was getting back up
from the ground.

The Appellant was asked, "Was it water or was it ice or what was it?"

(Augmented Record, Second Affidavit of Chris H. Hansen in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, Exhibit A Deposition ofIrina Shea, p. 24, Ln. 25, file-stamped August 20,2012) Her
response was that it was possibly a mixture of both. The Appellant observed water on the
ground in front of her car. (Augmented Record, Second Affidavit of Chris H. Hansen in Support
of Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit A Deposition of Irina Shea, p. 66, Ln. 1-6, filestamped August 20, 2012) She did not expect the water to have a coat of ice underneath it, nor
did she expect what appeared to be water was actually ice. Similar to McCasland above, the
Appellant here could not have anticipated that under the water would be a coat of thick ice that
would cause her to fall and break her wrist. Similarly, there is no way the Appellant could have
seen the ice mixed with the water as both substances are clear.
As noted above, it is the responsibility of the Respondent in a situation where the
condition is ongoing to ensure the safety of his invitees. The Respondent failed to do that in this
instance, and was negligent by his actions.
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The facts shown to the District Court was that the car wash created a pool of water at the
exit, the temperature on the day of the incident was within the range for freezing weather, the
Appellant observed water and slipped on something underneath the water she believes to be ice,
or a mixture of water and ice, and the Defendant admitted the exit of the car wash was icy.
These facts, combined, create more than a scintilla of evidence to survive summary judgment on
the basis that there is a genuine issue of material fact.

Certainly with the addition of the

Affidavit of Irina Shea provided to the District Court at the First Motion for Reconsideration, the
Court should have seen that there were still questions of fact which must be resolved by ajury.
(c)

Did the District Court err when it denied Appellant's Second Motion for
Reconsideration?

After the District Court denied Appellant's First Motion for Reconsideration and
continued to apply the Antim standard, the Appellant attempted to direct the District Court's
attention to its perceived misuse of Antim and rather apply the ongoing condition standard rather
than the "isolated incident" standard. However, the District Court continued to apply Antim
rather than the ongoing condition standard. (R. VoL I, p. 80, Ln. 1) The District Court stated
that "there [was] nothing in the second motion to reconsider which appeared different from any
of the facts presented by the plaintiff in the prior motions that is relevant to a material fact
considered or relevant to the summary judgment." (Tr. Vol. I, p. 43, Lns. 19-23) Further, the
Respondent based his arguments at the second motion for reconsideration on "the second motion
for reconsideration is simply a rehash of arguments made before." (Tr. VoL I, p. 40, Lns. 5-6)
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This was used by the District Cou..rt in applying Rule 11 sal1ctions against the Appellallt

a~nd

her

attorney.
However, Idaho case law is clear that a motion for reconsideration does not have to have
new facts in order to be presented. The Court of Appeals said that "the case law applying Rule
11(a)(2)(B) permits a party to present new evidence when a motion is brought under that rule,
but does not require that the motion be accompanied by new evidence. Johnson v. Lambros, 143
Idaho 468, 472, 147 P.3d 100, 104 (Ct. App. 2006). Further, "the absence of new evidence
accompanying [a] motion for reconsideration did not, standing alone, require that the motion be
denied." Id. at 473, 105.
The Appellant's second motion for reconsideration to the District Court requested the
District Court review the standard for an ongoing condition such as the one at Lett's Car \Vash
and allowed the Appellant to establish a clear record for appeal. The District Court essentially
refused to consider the second motion for reconsideration on the basis that it did not contain new
evidence or law. Such a refusal is contrary to the standards of motions for reconsideration, and
thus, the District Court erred in denying Appellant's second motion for reconsideration on the
basis it lacked new law or facts.
V.

ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
A.

Should this Court award Appellant her attorney fees and costs on appeal?

The claims by this Appellant is a personal injury action where the damages exceed
$25,000.00. Under I.C §12-121, the Appellant's attorney fees and costs are appropriate if the
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Appellant is successful with this appeal and if this Court maKes a finding that the Respondent
defended this appeal frivolously. See Gonzalez v. Thacker, 148 Idaho 879, 231 P.3d 524 (2009).
Respondent's defense, including its legal arguments in summary judgment, cites the wrong legal
standard to apply for a condition such as the one in this case.

Further, the Respondent

consistently misrepresented the record throughout the summary judgment and motions for
reconsideration hearings.

The Appellant's deposition testimony, coupled with her affidavit

affirming her statements, created an issue of material fact and precluded summary judgment.
The District Court's error in applying the wrong standard to the case and compelling the
Appellant to appeal to this Court incurred attorney fees and costs which were unnecessary had
the District Court applied the correct standard at summary judgment.
Idaho Appellate Rule 40 provides for costs to a prevailing party at appeal. Additionally,
Idaho Appellate Rule 41 allows a party to request attorney fees and the Appellant so requests the
opportunity to submit a memorandum and affidavit in support ifthis Court so orders it.
VI.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellant Irina Shea requests this Court find that the District
Court erred by granting summary judgment to the Respondent, striking Paragraphs 3 and 5 of the
Affidavit of Henry Madsen, and denying Appellant's motions for reconsideration. The condition
caused by Lett's Car Wash was not an "isolated incident" and because of that the notice
requirements were waived. Lett's Car Wash had appropriate notice of his ongoing condition
because the Respondent testified that he had worked the car wash for 12 winters, had instructed
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employees to spread deicer on the exit, and most importantly, that the condition of the exit of the
car wash at the time the Appellant slipped and broke her wrist was cold and icy.
Further, that this Court award the Appellant her attorney fees and costs for this appeal
pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-121 and LA.R. 40 and 41.
Respectfully submitted this 24th day of June, 2013.
MADSEN LAW OFFICES, PC
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant/
Cross Respondent
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